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Inthe history of science researchers have often borrowed theories,
analogies, or metaphors from other fields, usually the better-developed
ones; in economic terms, they invested their human capital by acquiring
new and presumably more-advanced intellectual tools. The most con-
spicuous borrowing in nineteenth-century social science was the un-
fortunately imaginary set of the developmental sequences of societies,
worked out by anthropology and sociology on the basis of findings from
biological evolution. It is less often that scientists in a relatively developed
field become restive with its constraints and invade another with the
aspiration that their more powerful technical and theoretical tools will
solve problems with which the less-developed field has not adequately
coped. (This is a challenge I have sometimes hurled at physicists who
believe that the findings of sociology are simple-minded.) Over the past
two decades, physicists tried this successfully in their contributions to
molecular biology, and now economists have been expanding their world
by attempting to analyze problems usually brooded over by sociologists,
social psychologists, anthropologists, and political scientists.
In this case, interestingly enough, they will encounter colleagues in
these fields who have themselves been moving toward economic or quasi-
economic analysis of the same phenomena, though to be sure they have not
attempted many social analyses of purely market processes. Especially in
social psychology and sociology, a small group of theorists have for
nearly two decades been working out exchange and allocational problems
with the aid of economic ideas.
They have been hampered by their lack of mastery over the tools of
economics, their failure to use economics explicitly, and their unwilling-
ness—thus shouldering a burden economists of the past did not wish to
carry—to do much theorizing without the facts. In my own case, I have
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been trying to understand social-control systems, of which monetary
controls form one set, by considering how prestige, force and force threat,
and love or affection are accumulated, allocated, or lost. Even in my
monograph on divorce, written two decades ago, I was the first both to
demonstrate rather fully the inverse relationship between class position
and divorce rates (a prediction now made by Becker) and to give an
essentially economic explanation for it (see Goode 1956, 1962).
The differing styles of economics and sociology prevent me from making
an adequate, brief analysis of Becker's paper. I perceive many tautologies
in the paper, but I know that disturbs an economist less than a sociologist.
Where economists may be content with certain types of summary indexes,
I want to see a large cross-table of percentages. Often I must respond by
saying, in answer to an elegant set of mathematical formulas: "It is a
beautiful flight but it is not reliable for transportation"; that is, it simply
is not true—though that may seem to an economist only a crude answer.
An example of this would be Becker's formulation that late marriage and
the difficulty of divorce will be correlated. India, for example, has an early
age of marriage but very difficult divorce; in the West the main line of
division is between Catholic and non-Catholic countries, and in general
Catholic countries have almost no divorce but a slightly earlier age at
marriage (except for Ireland) than other Western countries; and so on.
Of course, to an economist, that may seem at best an unimaginative
answer.
In any event, though I am nervous about this invasion, I welcome it.
In these few pages I shall look at only a few minor points in Becker's
paper to illustrate a somewhat general problem that is often encountered
in some explorations by economists.
A major source of weakness in this bold foray into intellectual fields
such as sociology and political science that have been trying for generations
to create an autonomous noneconomic body of theory is Becker's failure
to be daring enough in a critical question, that is, whether any non-
monetary variables actually enter the calculations. In fact, as we see from
the very first stages (Becker 1973, p. 817), both the market and non-
market variables are aggregated to explain S, which is the "full income,
the maximum money attainable if the [i.e.,wage rates, of the jth
member] are constants."
Although I believe this monetary emphasis may ultimately be a weak-
ness, since the noncontractual structure of exchanges in those sectors may
create different behaviors than in the monetary sector,t we are left with
no assurance that the broadened economic formulation will be adequate,
since in fact it has not been fully built into the equations or tested. That
This matter is analyzed at length in my The Celebration of Heroes: Prestige as a Control
System (forthcoming). Meanwhile, see my Explorations in Social Theory (1973).COMMENT: NONMONETARY VARIABLES S29
is, the nonmonetary variables have not been given due weight, but have
been monetized.
That monetary equivalent, so tempting to the economist because of his
past training, can create both obstacles and factual errors in the analysis.
Perhaps I should add a theoretical point, that since the income figure is
purely hypothetical or imaginary, it has no greater degree of' reality than
an apparently subjective factor such as prestige.
To take a minor example, education is worth something on both the
market and nonmarket exchange systems, and for some purposes a high
education can be given an equivalent monetary value, but for a man with
little education, a wife with very much education is not worth as much as
one would suppose from her money value on the larger market. She is a
less-fit wife for him, by nonmonetary calculations—which would still be
economic—and he would be supported in this low evaluation by his
social circle.
Let us consider at length a more elaborate instance of the problems
this failure creates, specifically the lines of reasoning as to whether and
why polygyny occurred and why it has usually been the upper-strata men
who could or did take advantage of this opportunity. The case is in-
structive, for the focus on total monetary income leads to factual errors
and obscurities, but a general focus on nonmarket economic analysis
would clarify some of the facts we do know and leave one question
unsolved but at least not obscure.
Becker reasons—correctly, I think—that the total monetary output of
monogamy would be higher than that of either polyandry or polygyny.
Here the facts are more powerful than he supposes, for whether or not
multiple marriage was permitted or encouraged, it has not been common
in any society, except under very special conditions. For most men, in all
societies over time, polygyny was a statistically unlikely delight.
Obviously, a very low ratio of men to women—caused by successful
conquests or by high death rates in war—might permit polygyny for a
while, but such conditions are not likely to continue for long. Late mar-
riage for men and early marriage for women raise the chances somewhat,
but high mortality among women keeps the total number of woman-years
available to each man rather limited. As a consequence, polygyny has not
been general even where it is approved.
A purely market explanation may yield this aggregate result even if, as
I believe, the reasoning in its favor (see his section 3, above) is tautological.
That is, for most men and women the net market payoff is higher if they
pair together rather than make other types of arrangements. However,
this reasoning fails at the next step, the explanation for the unequal
distribution of women among men even where polygyny is permitted.
At this next step it is necessary to give due weight to strictly non-
monetary factors. First, Becker argues (see his section 3, above) that the
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"total output over all marriages could be greater if a second wife to an
able man added more to output than she would add as a first wife to a
less able one." Again leaving aside the tautological reasoning, this
hypothetical result, an increase in total output over all marriages, is
essentially empty as a motivating personal or social force in marital
decisions.
As in many family decisions, especially those concerning fertility, the
individual who decides does not ordinarily concern himself very much
with his or her effects on the total output, or society as a whole. Thus,
whether total output over all marriages is greater does not motivate people
to enter polygyny. If Becker disclaims this as a motive, it is nevertheless
obvious from the context that it is viewed as a partial explanation for the
distribution of wives in a society.
Nevertheless, if we ask only about higher or lower monetary output of
individual marriages, under Becker's assumptions we could expect that
able men would try to get a second wife, and their chances of success
would be greater than those of less able men.
If nothing else were involved, we could be satisfied that the unequal
distribution of wives among the total number of husbands is now ex-
plained, at least from the man's side (from the woman's side, the matter
is less clear, since under polygyny the husband takes a much larger share
than the wife does). Indeed we might then take a step further and predict
which economic strata of men would be able to reap this advantage, and
even how much they would pay in order to make this investment in a wife,
as compared with alternative investments in other types of capital goods.
Where, for example, as in much of Central Africa, women may earn
money by engaging in small-scale trading, or by tilling their own gardens
for the family, we might even be able to put real monetary values on this
kind of investment. Moreover, we might even give a better explanation for
polyandry than Becker essays, since for the most part such systems occur
where the productivity of a given man is low and he has little to invest in
a wife, so that a set of men (often brothers) pool their assets in order to
enjoy the benefits of one wife.2
However, reasoning from market or monetary total output, whether of
the marriage or of all marriages, would miss the importance of women as
goods, of women as producers of children, of women as links in purchasing
political power, of women as prestige commodities, for monetary reason-
ing would not predict that women would be added where their monetary
market output drops or almost stops upon entering marriage. For the
stubborn fact remains that multiple marriage is most common among the
2Inpolyandry these are often brothers, perhaps because this causes less strife; and this
alleviates somewhat the problem of producing one's ownchildren,which Becker speaks of
as a goal in marriage. In any event, whether or not the husbands are brothers, there are
usually rules to decide who is sociologically defined as father of a given child.COMMENT: NONMONETARY VARIABLES S3i
stratum that gets the least monetary ecdnomic output from wives, that is,
the most powerful and rich, who are most likely to wall them up and use
them as pets, display them as objects that prove the man's high position,
use them in power linkages, or even allow them to become parasites who
destroy the family wealth by their extravagance. Indeed, it seems reason-
able to assert that the higher the class position, the greater the likelihood
of some polygynous arrangements, but equally the greater the likelihood
that wives represent net losses, except in purely nonmarket goods. Like
some other monetary goods, they are in part "bought in special markets";
they are also like such goods in another respect, for instance, furs, polo
ponies, Rolls Royces, in that they can be put to other practical uses, and
in revolutions sometimes are.
Thus, I am asserting that the reasoning of Becker's paper sometimes
goes awry not because it uses economic reasoning in nonmarket areas, but
because it fails to take note of the powerful nonmarket variables, whose
effects may run counter to those of income variables, however these latter
are aggregated. Nor am I as yet sure that market prices or decisions
"prove" the total output is greater, whether of general nonmonetary or
monetary goods, under these arrangements. AsFrederickKnightsaidmore
than half a century ago, all suppliers are partially monopolies; and we
know that these markets are rigged.
In a parallel fashion, the reasoning fails in its attempt to explain the
decline of polygyny, that is, the system, in our time and to some extent
(although the facts are less clear) over a longer period of time—less clear
because we suppose that never in the history of the recent world have
most nations been polygynous except under rare conditions.
After flirting with a biological explanation, Becker involves himself in a
complex refutation of the claim that women would be better off econom-
ically if polygyny were abolished (see his section 3, above). But his
argument, and those he tries to refute, are essentially irrelevant, because
all of them still seem to refer to the total market output of the household.
It is much more likely that nonmonetary variables shape this decline in
polygyny.
Here, as so often in such ventures into why social structures assume their
sometimes peculiar shape, we have to ask, not merely about the non-
market variables, but who decides: who organizes the market. In spite of
Becker's graceful reference (n. 27) to Shaw's clever comment, the fact is
that we have no evidence from any time or place that women ever created
a polygynous system. It was men who established them, men whose
command of force and force threat, prestige, and wealth was paramount
in all the societies we know. Doubtless, some women did better econom-
ically under such systems, as some women in the United States would if
they joined with other women to marry one rich and powerful man, but
the system as a whole was not created by women; and wherever new laws,I
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social movements, revolutionary ideologies, industrialization, urbaniza-
tion, or religion permit them a free market choice they move away from
polygyny.3
I shall not presume, especially in the midst of our contemporary
turmoil about who has the right to report what women feel, to know
precisely why women object to this system, although I think Becker's
earlier, excellent analysis of caring and sharing are relevant. From the
known fact that the birth rate under polygyny is less than under monog-
amy, and from the rules about equal sexual rights in polygynous systems,
we must infer that women do not get as much tenderness, affection, and
sexual enjoyment in those systems—again, we can use economic theory to
reason about these variables, but they are not monetary. Men are in a
much more influential position in such systems, and do not have to share
as much of the physical output of the family, as indeed they also monop-
olize much of the prestige-esteem output of the family. They have the
power to impose their own prices, in such systems. Thus, when external
constraints, including money-market constraints, permit, women decline
to enter such unions, even when they are still permitted.
I suggested earlier that after this critical commentary an important
puzzle would still remain, although it is one that Becker has really not
perceived clearly. It is why some social systemsarepolygamous, and others
are not. An explanation of a system may not be adequate as an explanation
of how some individuals act within it. The possibility that some men will
benefit from taking more than one wife does not explain why polygyny
occurs here rather than there—and it especially fails if we remember that
even in most such systems the typical marriage is a pairing, one man to
one woman. Why are such systems approved and viewed as an ideal,
though few can attain it?
I do not think that any current explanations work well, though doubt-
less when one does it will be some sort of nonmarket economic analysis.
That explanation would have to confront the fact that Western societies,
including Latin America, of course, have not been polygynous in any
historical period—and of course I do not mean only in the statistical or
distributional sense, but in the normative sense, that polygyny was never
a socially approved pattern of marriage. Both Japan and China have been
mainly monogamous, though in both cases wealthy or powerful men
could purchase additional concubines, and in China some of these came
close to being recognized as "secondary wives" with specific rights.
India, similarly, has been mainly monogamous, though again with a
much more open acceptance of concubines. Perhaps most societies outside
those great civilizations—but remember they encompass most of the
See in this connection the relevant sections of my World Revolution and Family Pa€teriu
(1963), csp. chap. 4 on Sub-Saharan Africa.
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world's population—have been polygamous in the specific but narrow
sense that some form of polygamy was normative, something to which
men and families aspired.
Whatever those explanatory variables will turn out to be when we
locate them, I rather suppose they will not be monetary, and—more
important—their impact will be seen primarily among the people who
dominated those sociopolitical systems and those marriage markets, that
is, the upper-strata men. Upper-strata men created a set of constraints
that defined the marriage and family market so as to yield great monetary
and nonmonetary advantages to them.
Few good theories in the history of science "fitted the facts" very well,
and the "facts" at any given time were partly wrong, so that each explorer
must follow his or her temperament rather than a rule which would
ground new thinking only on the facts or only on free speculation. I do
suspect, however, that a deeper sense of the crude regularities would not
hinder these elegant flights, but might pose still more interesting puzzles
for the imaginative economist. More fundamentally, I am at least partly
persuaded by the work before us that in several fields we are moving
toward a single structure of hypotheses about social behavior, hypotheses
supported by research in several different fields under different labels; and
that two decades hence we may discover we have created a rather im-
pressive body of social science—if not "unified," at least mutually
confirmatory. Becker's explorations are an important step in that progress.
H